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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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15 January 1970
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., NSC
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Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, ACDA
Mr. Frank Perez, State
Dr. Ronald Easley, OSD/DDR&E
Dr. William Van Cleave, OSD/ISA
Maj. William Barlow, OSD/SA

The attached outlines the CIA contribution in response to Task Y Item II. I would appreciate proposed revisions prior to our Friday meeting. Call 143-7111.

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Special Assistant for
Strategic Arms Talks

Attachment:
Outline of Verification
Policy Options, Task 11

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2002

NLND


Mandatory Review

Case NLN 02-16

Doc. 3

5 pages

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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

OUTLINE OF VERIFICATION POLICY OPTIONS

-- TASK 11 --

General-- The paper will summarize our problems and policy options relating to verification. The general subject of national means of verification will be addressed as well as selective direct observation (SDO) and potential "forms of cooperation" that may be used to improve our monitoring capability. The paper will include 1) definition of the term "national means of verification" 2) the sensitivity of various collection systems and their relationship to estimating the status of Soviet capabilities, 3) US appreciation of Soviet collection and analysis of information on US systems, 4) the relationship between collection assurance and the type of SALT agreement that may be reliably monitored, 5) policy to date involving SALT discussion of "national means" and 6) policy issues to be resolved. Some expansion of these headings follows:

1. Means of Verification - national and cooperative.

This section would cover the meaning of general term "national means", i.e. the type of technical collection systems now in use. It would then explain the forms of collection that could expand their capability, including arrangements on testing and the continuation of the usual national procedures in weapons development. Lastly, the section would introduce the subject of on-site inspection.

2. Sensitivity of U.S. Collection Systems

A review of substantive team reporting to date stresses the generally high degree of sensitivity of our technical collection systems. This section will state the necessity of maintaining our capabilities in this area. Consequently in any subsequent US-Soviet bi-lateral discussions, where agreement

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

may or may not be reached, revelations regarding US technical collecting capabilities would have to be extremely guarded. Examples of sensitivity will be provided.

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3. Soviet Capabilities for Technical Collection and Evaluation

Relatively little is known of actual Soviet capabilities against the US in the technical collection and evaluation field. Preliminary evaluation suggests, however, that Soviet capability and methodology are much less sophisticated than those of the U.S. The "system components" issue raised at Helsinki-and consequent negative Soviet reaction-tend to support this view. A more detailed assessment of Soviet limitations in this area could considerably facilitate further bi-lateral discussions on technical verification means. It would provide the US with a better "feel" for what and how much we might reveal with regard to our own capability and methodology. More work is needed in this area before definitive conclusions can be drawn. Tentatively, the paper will hold that the Soviets would probably be amazed at the sophistication of US technical analysis.

4. Collection assurance and SALT agreements

It should be realized that definite interrelationships exist between continued collection of technical data and the type of SALT agreements that can be reliably monitored. The guarantee of information from photographic satellites,

-2-

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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

for example, would support a quantitative agreement, while a guarantee of telemetry data would be required to support agreements involving qualitative aspects of weapons systems. This section would delve into this relationship and discuss the issue of collection assurance as it relates to the collateral constraints developed by the verification teams.

5. US Policy Concerning Verification

Current U.S. Policy on SALT verification is outlined in ACDA Memorandum TCS 38637-69, dated 21 May 1969, entitled "Strategic Missile Talks: Related Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Disclosure Policy." This document proposes three alternative approaches the US might take in regard to the problem of verification ranging from exclusive reliance on national means to selective direct observation (SDO). Guidance to the Helsinki delegation was non-committal in this area and specific policy has not been determined. In any bi-lateral agreement involving exclusively national means of verification there is a requirement for an understanding that neither side interfere significantly with the others verification capability. Such an agreement could be spelled out formally or be subject to tacit understanding by both sides. Examination of the existing US-USSR nuclear testing treaty might provide additional guidance as to how best to handle this possible verification interference problem.

6. Verification Policy Issues

A number of key issues emerge with regard to future US policy on verification. Among these may be included the following:

- How extensive need our future discussions with the Soviets be in order to obtain sufficient assurance that our various collection systems will be allowed to reliably monitor Soviet compliance.
- Are there forms of verification cooperation, in which the US should engage while at the same time assuring our own national means of verification?

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

-3-
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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

- Should we push any further on the subject of on-site inspection.
- Does the sensitivity of our "national means" preclude discussions of some issues with the Soviets.
- Can we accept SALT agreements that involve qualitative aspects of weapons systems without understanding on the non-interference with our means to monitor that type of agreement. At risk is the loss of all data on Soviet weapons developments if the Soviets discuss and then do not agree.
- At what stage in the talks should we raise the issue of non-interference with national means."
- Should we press for a formal or tacit understanding.

-3-

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

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